The Non-Identity Problem and the Wrongness of Birth
Derek Parfit's non-identity problem challenges our understanding of procreative ethics. If actions are only wrong if they are bad for someone, can it be wrong to create a life that is worth living?
Every essay we've published, newest first — antinatalism and philosophy alongside society, technology, spirituality, and mental health.
Derek Parfit's non-identity problem challenges our understanding of procreative ethics. If actions are only wrong if they are bad for someone, can it be wrong to create a life that is worth living?
This essay examines the most compelling counterarguments to antinatalism, from Pollyannaism to appeals to future good, and argues for their ultimate insufficiency in the face of suffering.
Rising rates of mental illness and alienation in late modernity lend credence to the antinatalist assessment of existence.
To create new life under the banner of a loving God requires reconciling procreation with the problem of evil. This essay argues that theological defenses fail.
While Camus and Sartre championed creating meaning in a meaningless world, their existential premises can be read as a profound critique of procreation itself.
The Buddhist diagnosis of universal suffering (dukkha) finds a modern echo in antinatalism. An examination of their shared logic reveals the profound wisdom of non-birth.
A critical examination of the cultural, religious, and economic machinery that frames procreation not as a choice, but as a default.
Derek Parfit's non-identity problem challenges the coherence of antinatalism and procreative ethics by questioning whether it is possible to harm someone by bringing them into a life that is still worth living.
A philosophical examination of the most common objections to antinatalism and a critical assessment of their shortcomings in the face of existential reality.
In an age of unprecedented connectivity and material wealth, why are we lonelier and more desperate than ever? This essay explores the crisis of late modernity through the lens of philosophical pessimism and the antinatalist diagnosis.