The Non-Identity Problem and the Wrongness of Birth

Introduction

The non-identity problem, a puzzle formulated by philosopher Derek Parfit, presents a formidable challenge to our intuitions about the ethics of procreation. At its heart, the problem questions whether an action can be considered wrong if it doesn’t make anyone worse off. This conundrum is particularly potent in the context of creating new lives. If a child is brought into existence with a life that, while not perfect, is still worth living, can we say that the act of creating that child was wrong? The non-identity problem forces us to confront the unsettling possibility that many actions we instinctively feel are morally questionable may not, in fact, be so.

Core Argument

Parfit’s core argument in the non-identity problem can be broken down as follows:

1. An action can only be wrong if it is bad for someone. 2. Creating a person with a life worth living, even if that life contains some suffering, is not bad for that person because the alternative for that person is non-existence. 3. Therefore, creating a person with a life worth living is not wrong.

This line of reasoning has profound implications for procreative ethics. It suggests that as long as a future child’s life is, on balance, more good than bad, it is morally permissible to bring them into existence. This challenges the antinatalist view, most famously articulated by David Benatar, which argues that procreation is always a harm. The non-identity problem forces antinatalists and others who question the morality of procreation to find a way to explain the wrongness of birth without appealing to the idea that it is bad *for the person who is born*.

Historical Background

The non-identity problem is a relatively recent development in philosophy, but it builds on a long tradition of pessimistic thought. In the 19th century, Arthur Schopenhauer argued that life is an endless cycle of willing and suffering, and that it would be better not to exist at all. "Life," Schopenhauer wrote, "is a business that does not cover its costs." While Schopenhauer’s pessimism was not directly concerned with the non-identity problem, his work laid the groundwork for later thinkers who would question the value of existence.

In the 20th century, existentialist philosophers like Albert Camus and Jean-Paul Sartre grappled with the absurdity of a meaningless universe. While they did not explicitly address the non-identity problem, their work raised questions about the justification for bringing new people into a world devoid of inherent purpose. The Romanian philosopher Emil Cioran, a more direct heir to Schopenhauer’s pessimism, went even further, writing that "It is not worth the bother of killing yourself, since you always kill yourself too late."

It was against this backdrop that Derek Parfit, in his 1984 book *Reasons and Persons*, introduced the non-identity problem. Parfit’s work revolutionized the way philosophers think about population ethics and the morality of procreation. He showed that our common-sense intuitions about these issues are often inconsistent and that we need a more rigorous theoretical framework to make sense of them.

Supporting Evidence

The non-identity problem has been a source of much debate in contemporary philosophy. Many thinkers have found it to be a powerful argument against antinatalism. For example, the philosopher Jeff McMahan has argued that, while it may be regrettable that a person is born with a disability, it is not necessarily a harm to that person. If the person’s life is still worth living, then they have not been made worse off by being brought into existence.

David Benatar, the most prominent contemporary antinatalist, has acknowledged the force of the non-identity problem. In his book *Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming into Existence*, Benatar attempts to solve the problem by arguing that there is a crucial asymmetry between the good and bad things in life. While the absence of pain is good, the absence of pleasure is not bad. This asymmetry, Benatar argues, means that it is always a harm to bring someone into existence, even if their life contains more pleasure than pain.

Counterarguments

Despite its influence, the non-identity problem is not without its critics. Many philosophers have argued that there must be something wrong with Parfit’s reasoning. Some have suggested that we should reject the first premise of the argument, that an action can only be wrong if it is bad for someone. Perhaps some actions are simply wrong in themselves, regardless of their consequences. For example, we might think that it is wrong to create a person with a serious disability, even if that person’s life is still worth living. This is the “impersonal-wrongness” view.

Others have argued that we should reject the second premise of the argument. Perhaps it is bad for a person to be brought into existence with a life that is not as good as it could have been. This is the “comparative harm” view. For example, if we could have created a person with a better life, but chose to create a person with a worse life, we have harmed the person we created.

Rebuttals

The impersonal-wrongness view has been criticized for being counterintuitive. It seems strange to say that an action is wrong even if it doesn’t harm anyone. The comparative-harm view has also been criticized. It seems strange to say that we have harmed someone by bringing them into existence, even if their life is worth living. After all, the alternative for that person was non-existence, not a better existence.

Despite these criticisms, many philosophers remain convinced that there is something wrong with the non-identity problem. The problem continues to be a major topic of debate in ethics and political philosophy. It is a puzzle that has no easy solution, and it is likely to continue to fascinate and frustrate philosophers for years to come.

Conclusion

The non-identity problem is a powerful challenge to our common-sense intuitions about the ethics of procreation. It forces us to confront the unsettling possibility that many actions we instinctively feel are morally questionable may not, in fact, be so. While the problem has no easy solution, it has profound implications for how we think about our responsibilities to future generations. It is a puzzle that we must continue to grapple with if we are to develop a coherent and defensible theory of procreative ethics.

Frequently Asked Questions

What is the non-identity problem in simple terms?

The non-identity problem is a philosophical puzzle that asks whether it can be wrong to create a person with a life that is worth living, even if that life has some suffering. The problem arises because if we had not created that person, they would not have existed at all, so we haven’t made them worse off.

How does the non-identity problem relate to antinatalism?

The non-identity problem is a major challenge to antinatalism, the view that it is always wrong to bring new people into existence. Antinatalists argue that procreation is always a harm, but the non-identity problem suggests that if a person’s life is worth living, they have not been harmed by being brought into existence.

What are some of the proposed solutions to the non-identity problem?

There are many proposed solutions to the non-identity problem, but none of them are without their critics. Some of the most common solutions include rejecting the idea that an action can only be wrong if it harms someone, and arguing that it is bad for a person to be brought into existence with a life that is not as good as it could have been.

Has the non-identity problem been solved?

No, the non-identity problem has not been solved. It continues to be a major topic of debate in philosophy, and there is no consensus on how to resolve it.

What are the implications of the non-identity problem for our everyday lives?

The non-identity problem has profound implications for how we think about our responsibilities to future generations. It forces us to question our assumptions about the morality of procreation and to think more carefully about the kind of world we are creating for those who will come after us.