Careful, long-form thinking on antinatalism, the asymmetry argument, philosophical pessimism, and the ethics of bringing new life into the world. We read Schopenhauer and Benatar alongside Buddhist and Stoic traditions — not as self-help, but as serious attempts to make sense of suffering, consent, and what it means to exist.
Is it ethically defensible to bring a person into existence without their consent? This essay examines the consent problem as a central challenge to the ethics of procreation.
David Benatar posits that coming into existence is always a net harm due to a crucial asymmetry between pain and pleasure, a claim with deep ethical implications.
Emil Cioran's aphorisms offer a literary and deeply personal form of antinatalist witness, arguing that existence itself is the primary harm.
This essay explores the strongest counterarguments to antinatalism, from Pollyannaism to appeals to future good, and argues for their ultimate insufficiency.
To be born is to be brought into existence without consent. This essay examines whether this fundamental imposition can be ethically justified.
David Benatar's asymmetry argument posits that coming into existence is always a harm. This essay explores the argument's logic, historical context, and philosophical implications.
Emil Cioran's aphorisms offer a unique, literary testimony against procreation, diverging from the systematic arguments of contemporary antinatalism.
This essay explores the most compelling counterarguments to antinatalism, from appeals to gratitude to the potential for future good, and articulates why these objections ultimately fail to overcome the ethical asymmetry of existence.
Is non-existence preferable to a life of absurdity? We pit Camus, Sartre, and Cioran against each other on the question of birth.
David Benatar’s asymmetry argument posits that coming into existence is always a harm because the absence of pain is good, but the absence of pleasure is merely not bad. This essay critically examines his argument.